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Abstract
Our focus in this work is to provide mechanisms to enable the fuzzy set based ap-
proximate reasoning (AR) system to deal with conflicts in knowledge. The basic con-
cepts of the theory of AR are introduced. The issue of conflict is raised and some of its
bizarre eects are described. We then turn to some modifications of the basic AR
mechanisms to ameliorate these eects. Two approaches strong and weak entailment are
investigated. Next we consider some approaches to avoid conflict. Here again two ap-
proaches are considered. The first is a weighting of knowledge with respect to our belief
in the certainty of its content. The second is a prioritization of the knowledge. Ó 2000
Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Approximate reasoning (AR) is a very powerful mechanism for the repre-
sentation and manipulation of knowledge [1–5]. It provides in one framework
an extension of the classical binary logic as well as an extension of the variable-
functional modeling used in many disciplines such as engineering and physics.
In [6], we discuss how this system can provide a basis for the development of
intelligent/information systems by allowing for the implementation of Zadeh’s
agenda of computing with words [7]. The fuzzy systems modeling technique
which is the foundation of the very successful technology used in the
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construction of fuzzy logic controllers is based on the methodology of ap-
proximate.
At the heart of approximate reasoning is the idea of representing knowledge
by assigning values to variables. This assignment is generally carried out by
associating fuzzy sets with variables. This assignment of sets, as the value of
variables, provides a natural framework for including uncertainty in our
knowledge, in addition, the use of fuzzy subsets enables the representation of
knowledge expressed in linguistic form. The association of sets with variables
can be seen as imposing constraints on the possible value of variables, the use
of fuzzy sets induces soft or graded constraints [8]. The manipulation of
knowledge in AR involves combining of dierent pieces of knowledge. Since
our knowledge is expressed in terms of sets the combining process is generally
based on a conjunction like operation.
Conflict can be seen as a state in which two or more pieces of knowledge
associate values with a variable that are incompatible. The appearance of
conflict is a result of the state of our knowledge and not induced by the rea-
soning system we use, nevertheless the reasoning system must be suitably
prepared to deal with this conflict. Formally the occurrence of conflict can be
seen to be related to the appearance of the null set as the result of some
combining operation, a situation which usually induces diculties. In the
reasoning mechanism used in classical logic the appearance of conflict results in
a situation in which everything is assumed to be true. This situation is closely
related to the desire to imbue the reasoning system with the very desirable
property of monotonicity. The basic approximate reasoning system also has
this characteristic, conflict implies everything is true. In many ways this situ-
ation is anti-intuitive. It is our purpose in this work to try to provide the
approximate reasoning systems with alternative mechanisms to more appro-
priately handle situations in which conflict in our knowledge occurs. We first
suggest two alternative mechanisms for modifying inference in AR. These
mechanisms, called strong and weak entailment, modify the entailment prin-
ciple, the basic inference tool in AR. Our second direction is to try to avoid or
lessen the eect of conflict by relaxing the constraints imposed by our
knowledge. Here we first suggest a weighting associated with each piece of
knowledge and use this weight to appropriately relax the constraints imposed
by the pieces of knowledge. The second approach is to prioritize our know-
ledge. This allows lower priority knowledge to defer to higher priority know-
ledge to avoid conflict.
2. Basic concepts of AR
The primary elements of an AR representation are a collection of variables,
Vj for j  1 to n, called atomic variables. Associated with each variable Vj is a
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set Xj, indicating the allowable values for the variable, this set is called the
domain or universe of discourse of Vj. It is assumed that the variable Vj attains
one and only one value in its domain. A joint variable is any tuple of one or
more distinct atomic variables; V3; V2; V5 and V1; V2; V6 are examples of joint
variables. Associated with any joint variable is a set consisting of the Cartesian
product of the domains of the variables making up the joint variable.
A proposition (or statement) in AR is an object of the form
V is A;
where V is a joint variable and A is a fuzzy subset of the domain of V. A
proposition which involves only one variable is called a canonical or atomic
proposition while those involving two or variables are sometimes called rela-
tional or joint propositions.
Propositions in AR can be seen as imposing restrictions on the possible
values of the variables involved [9,10]. For example, if A is a crisp subset then
the meaning of the proposition V1 is A is to indicate that the value for the
variable V1 is restricted to be a member of the set A, that is elements in A are
the only possible values for V1. The use of fuzzy subsets provides for a
grading of this idea. Thus one meaning of the canonical proposition V1 is B,
where B is a fuzzy subset, is that for any x 2 X1;Bx indicates the degree of
possibility that V1  x [11]. If V is a joint variable, V  V1; V2; V3, then the
meaning of the proposition V is M is that for any x1; x2; x3 2 X1  X2  X3;
Mx1; x2; x3 is the possibility that simultaneously V1  x1; V2  x2 and
V3  x3.
We shall say a proposition, V is M , is normal (consistent) if there exists at
least one element in the base set of V that has possibility one, MaxxMx  1.
We shall call a proposition subnormal if MaxxMx < 1. We call a proposition
V is M a tautology if Mx  1 for all x in the domain of V. It should be noted
that a tautology existentially provides no restriction on the value of a variable
and thus introduces no new information.
In [3], we discussed a number of basic operations used in AR. Assume Va
and Vb are two joint variables on the universes X and Y, respectively. Let
Va is D and Vb is E be two propositions. Their conjoin (conjunction) denoted
Va is D Vb is E is the proposition V is F , where V is a joint variable con-
sisting of the union of the atomic variables making up Va and Vb. F is a fuzzy
subset of the domain of V ; Z; such that for each z 2 Z
F z  Dx ^ Ey ^ is the min operation;
where x is the projection of z to the universe X and y is the projection of z to
the universe Y. In the case when the two variables being conjoined are the same
the conjoin operation reduces to the usual intersection of fuzzy sets
Va is D Va is E  Va is D \ E.
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We define the operation Va is A Vb is B as resulting in V is D, where again
V is the union of the atomic variables in the joint variables Va and Vb and D is a
fuzzy subset on the universe of V such that
Dz  Ax _ By; _ is the max operation:
Here again x is the projection of z to the universe X and y is the projection of z
to the universe Y. It should be noted that if Va and Vb are the same, this op-
erator is the union, with this in mind we can use [ synonymously with .
Assume Va and Vb are two joint variables such that Vb contains all the
variables that are in Va. The cylindrical extension of the proposition Va is F to
Vb is the proposition Vb is F ° defined by Vb is F °  Va is F  Vb is X , where X is
the domain of the variable Vb.
Another basic operation used in approximate reasoning is containment.
Assume Va is D and Vb is E are two propositions, we say that Va is D contains
Vb is F denoted Vb is E  Va is D if
F °zP D°z for all z;
where F ° and D° are the cylindrical extensions of F and D to the base set of
variable V, the union of the atomic variables in Va and Vb. We note that if Va
and Vb the same joint variable then this simply a requirement that F xP Dx
for all x in the domain of this joint variable.
The fundamental inference mechanism in AR is called the entailment prin-
ciple. The entailment principle says that from the proposition Va is A we can
infer the proposition Vb is B, denoted Va is A ` Vb is B, if Va is A  Vb is B.
The combination of conjoin and entailment provide the basis of the rea-
soning system used in AR. Assume we have a knowledge base P  fP1; . . . ; Png,
where Pj is an AR proposition. The process of making inferences in AR con-
sists of the following:
1. Conjoin all the available knowledge: KB  P1  P2      Pn.
2. A proposition H is inferable from P if KB  H ,
we denote this as P1; . . . ; Pn ` H . An important property of this inference
process is its monotonicity [3]. This property says that if P1; . . . ; Pn ` H then
P1; . . . ; Pn; Pn1 ` H . One implication of this is that as we obtain more
knowledge we still maintain all inferences we have already made.
A second feature of this machinery is that we can use a deductive reasoning
process [3].
Definition. A deduction from a set of premises P  fP1; . . . ; Png is a sequence of
propositions B1;B2;B3; . . . ;Bq, where each Bk is one of the following:
1. A premise from P.
2. A tautology.
3. For some i < k Bi  Bk.
4. For some i; j < k Bk  Bi  Bj.
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The deductive reasoning mechanism is as follows. If there exists from the set
of premises fP1; . . . ; Png a deduction terminating in the proposition H then
P1; . . . ; Pn ` H ;H is inferable from P. An important aspect of this deductive
process is that to infer H from P we just need use only a relevant subset of the
knowledge in P. This deductive reasoning process can be seen to strongly
rooted in the monotonicity of the basic inference process.
Finally let us look at the information contained in the propositions of AR.
Consider the statement V is A, where V is an atomic variable, for simplicity we
shall assume A is a crisp subset. Eectively this statement is saying that our
knowledge of the value of the variable V is that it is an element in the set A.
Thus all the elements in A are possible values for V. We observe that the
smaller the subset A the more information we have about the value of the
variable V. Knowing that John is between 20 and 25 is more informative then
knowing that he is between 20 and 30. One proviso should be noted with re-
spect to the observation that the smaller the set A the more knowledge we have
about V. This proviso is with respect to the case in which A is the empty set.
Since the statement V is A indicates that the value of V can only be an element
in the set of A, if A is the null set, there exists no elements in A and we are faced
with a conflict, there are no elements which can be the value of V. This is
clearly a very uninformative situation.
In [12], Yager discusses the concept of specificity of a fuzzy subset. Assume
A is a fuzzy subset of the space X. The measure of specificity of A, denoted
SpA, is a number in the unit interval such that:
1. SpA  1 if A is a crisp subset consisting of exactly one element, A  fxg for
some x 2 X .
2. Sp;  SpX   0.
3. If A and B are two normal fuzzy subsets of X, then SpAP SpB if A  B.
A number of dierent manifestations of this measure have been discussed in
the literature [12]. One manifestation that we shall find useful is the following.
Assume x is an element with maximal membership grade in A;Ax 
MaxxAx. Let Averx 62X Ax be the average of all the elements in X excluding
x then
SpA  Ax ÿAverx 62X Ax:
Here we see that SpA is the maximal membership grade in A minus the av-
erage of the membership grades of the other elements.
One application of the measure of specificity is that it provides a measure
of the amount of information contained in a proposition in AR. If P is
the proposition V is A then the amount of information contained in P ;
InfP   SpA. The connection between specificity and information is based
upon the fact that specificity measures the degree to which a fuzzy subset
contains one and only one element. We can see that sets containing one and
only one element are the most informative, we know exactly the value of the
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variable, no uncertainty exists. As a set moves away from having one element
either by having many elements or by having no elements, the information it
provides about its associated variable becomes less. In the case when we have
many possible values for a variable we lack information because we do not
know which is the correct one. On the other hand when the set assigned to a
variable becomes empty we have no information as to the value associated with
the variable.
3. Some manifestations of conflicting knowledge
In the preceding we have used two basic operations in the process of in-
ference in approximate reasoning: conjunction and entailment. We shall look
at the performance and eect of using these operators, particular consideration
will be given to the informational point of view.
The operation of conjunction is used to combine pieces of knowledge. Since
this is an associative operation, we can consider its working with just two
pieces of information. With conjunction we take two propositions, P1 and P2,
and combine them to obtain a new proposition, P  P1  P2. Essentially, here
we are taking the knowledge P1 : V is A and P2 : V is B and obtaining
P : V is D, where D  A \ B.
From an informational point of view, we would normally expect that this
process results in at least as much information as the individual pieces being
conjoint. The following theorem provides a step in this direction:
Theorem. Let P1 and P2 be two propositions in AR and let P  P1  P2  V is D.
If D is normal, has least one element with membership grade one, then
InfP P InfP1 and InfP P InfP2.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let P1  V is A; P2  V is B and P3  V
is D, where D  A \ B, where A;B and D are fuzzy subsets of X  fx1; . . . ; xng.
Since P is normal, there exists some x 2 X . Let it be x1, such that
Ax1  Bx1  Dx1  1. As we have indicated, the information contained in
a proposition in AR is the specificity of the associated fuzzy subset. Hence
InfP1  SpA  1ÿ 1nÿ 1
Xn
j2
Axj;
InfP2  SpB  1ÿ 1nÿ 1
Xn
j2
Bxj;
InfP   SpD  1ÿ 1
nÿ 1
Xn
j2
Dxj:
20 R.R. Yager / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 25 (2000) 15–42
Since Dxj  Axj ^ Bxj then Dxj6Axj and Dxj6Bxj and hence
SpA6 SpD and SpB6 SpD: 
In the case in which the conjunction of propositions leads to a non-normal
proposition, there exists the possibility of loss of information when combining
propositions. The following example illustrates this.
Example. Assume
A  1
x1
;
0:9
x2
;
0
x3
;
0
x4
 
and B  0:1
x1
;
0
x2
;
1
x3
;
0
x4
 
;
then
D  A \ B  0:1
x1
;
0
x2
;
0
x3
;
0
x4
 
;
and SpA  1ÿ 0:9=3  0:7; SpB  1ÿ 0:1=3  0:97 and SpD 
0:1ÿ 0=3  0:1: Here we see that Sp(D) is less than both Sp(A) and Sp(B) and
thus the result of combining these two pieces of information is loss of infor-
mation, reduced specificity.
The fundamental issue here is conflict. We note that, when D is subnormal,
there exists some conflict with respect to the information supplied by V is A
and V is B. That is, in the case when the conjoin is subnormal, there exists no
solution that fully satisfies both conjoined propositions. The smaller the
MaxxDx, the more conflicting. What we have seen is that conflict can result
in a loss of information. So, essentially, we see that conflict tends to introduce
unusual behavior when combining knowledge.
Let us now look at the entailment principle. We recall this principle says from
V is A we can infer V is B if A  B, this the fundamental inference mechanism
in AR. Here we would normally expect propositions resulting from its appli-
cation to have no more information than the propositions from which they are
generated. The following theorem supports this in the normal case.
Theorem. Assume V is A is a normal proposition and V is A  V is B then
SpAP SpB.
Proof. In this case, assuming Ax1  1, we have SpA 
1ÿ1=nÿ1Pnj2 Axj and SpB1ÿ1=nÿ1Pnj2 Bxj. Since BxjPAxj,
we get SpA6SpB. 
Consider now the case in which A is subnormal. We shall show in the following
example that it is possible for us to increase information via the use of the
entailment principle.
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Example. Assume A  f0:5=x1; 0:7=x2g and B  f1=x1; 0:7=x2g, we note A  B.
Thus from the proposition V is A we can infer V is B. However in example
we have SpA  0:7ÿ 0:5  0:2 and SpB  1ÿ 0:7  0:3: Thus, SpB
6 SpA.The occurrence of subnormality, conflict, provides a window in which
some rather disconcerting inferences can occur via the entailment principle.
The following illustrates an extreme example of the situation. Assume we have
a knowledge base involving the variable V whose domain is
X  f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6g. Assume the following two propositions reside in this
knowledge base
P1 : V is f1g;
P2 : V is f2g:
These two propositions are completely conflicting. The conjunction of these
two pieces of knowledge V is ;, the null set. From this we can, using the en-
tailment principle, infer V  f3g. Here we see the rather troubling inference
that from the knowledge, where V  1 and V  2, we can infer V  3.
Thus, we see that while the AR system works well, satisfies our intuition, in
the case where no conflict exists in the knowledge being used, the existence of
conflict, subnormality, causes it to give anti-intuitive results. We should point
out that this problem, diculties with conflicting knowledge, is not peculiar to
the theory of approximate reasoning, but arises in other reasoning systems
such as the classic propositional logic. We note that some of the work related
to non-monotonic logics [13] is an attempt to deal with these issues. In the
following, we shall suggest some modifications to our system that will lead to
more intuitive results in the face of conflict.
4. Strong entailment inference
In this section, we shall suggest an alternative inference procedure based on
a modification of the entailment principle. This modification performs the
same as the original when no conflict exists, however as we shall see, this
modification will eliminate troublesome inferences that occur under conflict.
However, this new procedure comes with its own diculties, especially com-
putational.
We first introduce a modified definition of the concept of entailment.
Definition. We shall say that the proposition Va is A strongly entails the prop-
osition Vb is B if
1. Va is A  Vb is B.
2. Maxy By6MaxxAx.
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We shall use the symbol b to indicate strong entailment.
Eectively condition 2 requires that any proposition Vb is B strongly en-
tailed from Va is A satisfies
PossVb is B j Va is A6PossVa is A j Va is A;
it is no more possible than Va is A given Va is A.
It should be clear that if A is normal, MaxxAx  1, then everything en-
tailed is also strongly entailed. However, if A is subnormal, then their are
propositions that are entailed, but not strongly entailed.
The following theorem provides a useful result with respect to strong en-
tailment.
Theorem. If Va is A b Vb is B then the maximal membership grades in A and B
must be the same.
Proof. From condition 2 in the definition of strong entailment, we see that the
maximum membership grade in B must be no greater than the maximum
membership grade in A. On the other hand, condition one implies the opposite.
Thus, the result follows.
Note. Assume Va and Vb are disjoint variables, if MaxxAx  a; then if
Va is A b Vb is B;B is such that By  a for all y.
If P  Va is A is a proposition in AR, in which X is the domain of A, then we
shall denote MaxP  as the maximal membership grade in A, that is
MaxP  Maxx2X Ax. In this situation we see that MaxP  indicates the
maximal possibility that there is a solution to Va in its domain. This observa-
tion follows, since MaxxAx  PossVa is X j Va is A. We shall also denote
Conf P   1ÿMaxP 
as the degree of conflict or subnormality in P.
Using this idea of strong entailment, we can now provide a new modified
inference mechanism for AR called the strong entailment principle.
Assume we have a collection of AR propositions P  fP1; P2; . . . ; Png con-
stituting our knowledge. We shall say that the proposition H is inferable from
this collection, denoted,
P1; P2; . . . ; Pn `s H
if P1  P2      Pn b H :
We are saying that H is inferable from our premise if it is strongly entailed
by the conjunction of the premise. We shall, when necessary for discussion
purposes, refer to this as strong inference to distinguish it from the usual in-
ference. Thus, we see that strong inference is basically the following process:
R.R. Yager / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 25 (2000) 15–42 23
1. Form the conjoin of all propositions in our knowledge base
KB  P1  P2      Pn:
2. Infer H if KB bH .
We see then under this strong entailment mechanism any proposition H,
strongly inferred from our KB, has MaxH  MaxKB, it has the same
maximal possible element as KB. That is, if MaxKB  a and KB `s H , then
PossH=X   a:
In addition,
CertH jX   1ÿ Poss H=X 6 a;
its certainty given that the solution must lie in X is not greater than Max[KB].
We first note that if KB is normal, MaxKB  1, then the strong inference
leads to the same inferences as the ordinary inference process.
Observation. If KB is normal, MaxKB  1 then, for any H, if KB ` H , then,
KB `s H .
On the other hand, if KB is subnormal, some propositions ordinarily in-
ferable are not inferable via strong inference. In particular, we cannot infer any
proposition with membership grade greater than Max[KB]. With respect to this
the following observation is worth noting.
Observation. If our knowledge is completely conflicting, KB  V is ;; then
MaxKB  0 and the only inference we can make is V is ;:
Essentially, under this strong entailment, when faced with complete conflict,
all we can say is that we have a complete conflict. Under this strong inference,
we do not get any of the anti-intuitive inferences that arise when faced with
conflict using the ordinary inference mechanism. We see that a fundamental
dierence between this strong method and the ordinary method is that, in the
strong method, conflict reduces what we infer while, in the ordinary method,
conflict increases what we can infer.
We see that the new proposed inference mechanism works in the usual way
for non-conflicting knowledge; it leads to the same inferences as the ordinary
method. For partially conflicting data, we begin to reduce the number of in-
ferences until the situation in which we have complete conflict, where no in-
ferences, except the acknowledgement of complete conflict, are possible.
There is, however, another fundamental distinction between the inference
system based upon ordinary entailment and that is based upon the strong
entailment principle: the ordinary entailment based inference is monotonic,
while strong entailment based inference is non-monotonic. We recall a rea-
soning systems is called monotonic if the addition of knowledge allows us to
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still support any inference we made before this addition. Non-monotonicity
introduces the possibility that the addition of knowledge may result in a sit-
uation in we cannot infer something inferable before the addition. Thus to
show the non-monotonicity of the strong entailment inference, we need show
that it is possible for P1; P2; . . . ; Pn `s H while P1; P2; . . . ; Pn; Pn10sH . The
following example illustrates this.
Example. Assume V has domain X  f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6g. Let
P1 : V is f1; 2; 3g;
P2 : V is f3; 4g:
From this we can infer V is f3g. Consider the addition of the knowledge
P3 : V is f5; 6; g;
which leads to V is ; and hence nothing is possible.
The basis of the non-monotonicity is a reflection of the fact that
MaxP1  P2      PnP MaxP1  P2      Pn  Pn1:
Under strong entailment, anything inferable from fP1; . . . ; Png with a maximal
membership grade greater than MaxP1  P2      Pn  Pn1 is not inferable
from fP1; . . . ; Pn; Pn1g:
As a result a characteristic, arising in the case of strong entailment, is that
the addition of new knowledge may cause us to have to withdraw some in-
ferences that we have already made. This, is of course, the essence of non-
monotonicity. That is, in a dynamic environment, we can lose inferences.
However, there is another, and perhaps even a more significant problem that
arises with the loss of monotonicity. In a non-monotonic logic, any inference
made must take into account all of the knowledge available, this greatly
complicates and increases the diculty of reasoning. In particular, in a
monotonic logic, we can use the process of deduction as introduced earlier,
while in a non-monotonic system we cannot use deduction. We recall deduc-
tion allows us to use only the subset of premises needed to get to the conclusion
we want. In a non-monotonic system if some of the premises not included in
the deduction conflict with those we use in the deduction it forces us to re-
nounce the deduced fact. Thus, a fundamental diculty of the strong entail-
ment logic is its non-monotonicity which requires us always to consider all
knowledge available in making inferences. If our knowledge consists of the set
fP1; P2; . . . ; Png to infer H, we must always form KB  P1  P2      Pn and
then check if KB b H :
The inability to use inference processes such as deduction, which allow
the use of only a subset of the knowledge base, greatly increases the cost of
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reasoning. This is, of course, especially true in cases in which we have a large
body of knowledge.
As a step in the direction of addressing the diculty of reasoning in this
non-monotonic environment, we will consider the following theorem. First,
however, we introduce the following definition.
Definition. Assume H  V is A is a proposition in AR and let a 2 0; 1. We
define CAPH ; a as the AR proposition H 0  V is B, where Bx  Ax ^ a.
Theorem. Assume P  fP1; P2; . . . ; Png is a collection of propositions. Let
KB  P1  P2      Pn. Let fQ1; . . . ;Qmg be a subset of P. If
Q1;Q2; . . . ;Qm ` H ;
then
P1; P2; . . . ; Pn `s H 0;
where H 0  CAPH ;MaxKB.
Proof. Q1; . . . ;Qm ` H implies Q1      Qm  H . Since fQ1; . . . ;Qmg 
fP1; . . . ; Png then KB  Q1      Qm  H . Since H 0  CAPH ; MaxKB
then KB  H 0. Furthermore, since H 0  CAPH ; MaxKB then MaxH 0 
MaxKB, hence, KB b H 0.
This theorem says that, if from any subset of our knowledge base we are
able, using the usual inference method, to infer some proposition H then if we
CAP H by the maximum membership grade in our complete knowledge base,
we get a valid inference. Essentially then, we can use the usual monotonic
reasoning mechanism and still get results valid under strong inference. In
particular, since deduction uses a subset of our knowledge base, we can use
deduction.
Let us summarize the process:
1. Find Max[KB], the maximal membership grade in our knowledge base.
2. Using the ordinary reasoning mechanism, obtain KB ` H .
3. Then KB `s H 0, where H 0  CAPH ; MaxKB.
Here we are suggesting that the strong inference process, a non-monotonic
reasoning process, can be converted to the determination of a single value,
Max[KB], and the performance of a monotonic reasoning process. However, it
should be strongly emphasized that the process of obtaining Max[KB] requires
that we consider the whole knowledge base and this may be a dicult step to
perform. Recalling that Con[KB], the degree of conflict in the total knowledge
base is equal to 1ÿMAXKB information about Con[KB] is sucient
to implement the preceding. Thus if b  ConKB we can express H 0 as
CAPH ; 1ÿ b. The determination of the quantity b also, of course, requires
use of the whole knowledge base. In some ways conceptualizing in terms of
degree of conflict may be more natural.
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In some situations, where the processing of the whole knowledge base is
extremely costly, especially with respect to the importance of the problem being
solved, we may settle for an estimate of b (or Max[KB]) somewhat simplifying
the process. In this process of estimation it may be more natural to think in
terms of degree of conflict in the knowledge base.
In regard to this process of estimation it is interesting to note a kind of
monotonicity in the valuation of Max[KB] and Con[KB]. If P  fP1; . . . ; Png
and P0  fP1; . . . ; Pn; Pn1g then P  P0 and MaxKB6MaxKB0 and
ConKB0P ConKB. Thus we see that, as we obtain more knowledge, our
degree of conflict cannot get smaller. This observation may be helpful in the
construction of procedures to help extract from experts estimates of degree of
conflict in knowledge bases.
This strong reasoning system while clearly nonmonotonic, can be classified
in a category which we shall call quasi-monotonic. We shall call a reasoning
system quasi-monotonic if when no conflict exists in the knowledge base it acts
monotonically.
Definition. If R is a reasoning system and if P  fP1; . . . ; Png and
Q  fP1; . . . ; Pn; Pn1g then R is called quasi-monotonic if when P `R H it is
always the case that Q `R H if MaxKBQ  1.
It is interesting to note that the operation of capping generally leads to a loss
of information. Let H  V is A and let bH  CAPH ; a; bH  V is B, where
Bx  Ax ^ a. Without loss of generality assume Ax1 is the maximal
membership grade in A. In this situation
InfH  Ax1 ÿ 1nÿ 1
Xn
j2
Axj;
Inf bH   Ax1 ^ a ÿ 1nÿ 1Xn
j1
Axj ^ a;
InfH ÿ Inf bH 
 Ax1 ÿ Ax1 ^ a ÿ 1nÿ 1
Xn
j2
Axj ÿ Axj ^ a:
If Ax16 a then Axj ^ a  Axj and InfH  Inf bH . If Axj > a for j  1
to q then
InfH ÿ Inf bH   Ax1 ÿ a ÿ 1nÿ 1X
q
j2
Axj ÿ a:
Since Ax1 is the maximum, InfH ÿ Inf bH  > 0.
R.R. Yager / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 25 (2000) 15–42 27
A concept introduced in [3] is that of a minimal solution for a particular
variable. We recall that if V1 is an atomic variable, then the minimal solution of
V1 is V1 is A, where A  Projx1 KB. The significance of this minimal solution is
that any inferable proposition from the knowledge base about V1; V1 is B, is
such that A  B. Let us see what happens to this solution in the case of strong
inference. LetbAx  Ax ^ a;
where a MaxKB. Then we have KB `s V1 is A^. Assume KB `s V1 is B^, thenbA b bB:
That is B^, is strongly entailed by A^. From this we see that we can obtain A^, and
then use this as a minimal solution.
5. Weak entailment
In the preceding we introduced a modification of the basic AR inference
process called strong entailment to address issues related to conflict (subnor-
mality) in our knowledge base. In that approach, when complete conflict oc-
curs, we get the single inference V is ;. This is the special inference indicating
no solutions exist to the constraints imposed by our knowledge base. This
characteristic of the system avoids the introduction of anti-intuitive inferences
in the face of conflict. In essence, this approach is one in which we are at-
tributing conflict to the fact that the universe does not contain an appropriate
solution satisfying all the constraints imposed by the knowledge base. Thus the
information reported under conflict is that there are no possible solutions.
In the following we shall suggest an alternative modification of the basic
inference process to address the issue of conflict. When no conflict occurs, it
will act just like the ordinary reasoning process. In case of complete conflict,
this approach, called weak inference, again allows only one inference. However,
rather than being the null set, it is the whole universe of discourse. Thus, this
approach handles conflicts and avoids anti-intuitive inferences by simply say-
ing the answer must be somewhere in the domain but I do not know what it is.
It is noted that the spirit of the strong entailment inference is to attribute the
problems arising when conflict occurs to a lack of being able to find a solution
in the universe of discourse satisfying all the constraints imposed by the
knowledge base. It finds fault, not with the knowledge base, but with the fact
that we do not have enough possible solutions, hence when complete conflict
occurs it reports no solution is available. The spirit of weak entailment infer-
ence is dierent. It attributes the diculties which arise under conflict to
problems with the knowledge provided, not to a lack of available solutions. As
we shall see, the functioning of the weak entailment inference is one in which
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we universally reduce the confidence associated with all the premises as conflict
between any of them arises. Thus in the case of complete conflict, this meth-
odology will say that we have no confidence in any of the premise, and
therefore have no useful knowledge, and all we know is that the answer must be
in the universe of discourse. Thus the result of complete conflict is the removal
of all constraints and all that is inferable are tautologies. We shall also see, that
just as in the case of strong inference, the weak inference is non-monotonic and
quasi-monotonic.
We now introduce a modification of the basic entailment operation which is
the dual of the idea of strong entailment. We shall call this weak entailment,
and use it to build an inference mechanism.
Definition. We shall say that the proposition Va is A weakly entails the prop-
osition Vb is B if
1. Va is A  Vb is B.
2. Miny ByP 1ÿMaxxAx.
We shall denote this as Va is A e Vb is B:
In the above definition we have added to the usual definition of entailment
the requirement that the smallest membership grade in the entailed proposition
B is at least as large as the negation of the largest membership grade in A.
Condition two can be seen as a manifestation of the requirement that, given
Va is A, we can only infer a proposition Vb is B for which
PossVa is A j Va is X P PossVb is B j Vb is Y:
We see this as follows:
PossVa is A j Va is X  MaxxAx;
PossVb is B j Vb is Y Maxy  By  1ÿMiny By;
hence
MaxxAxP 1ÿMiny By
giving us
Miny ByP 1ÿMaxxAx:
Using the idea of weak entailment, we can provide a modified inference
mechanism called the weak entailment principle.
Assume we have a collection of propositions P  fP1; . . . ; Png. We shall say
that the proposition H is inferable from this collection, denoted,
P1; . . . ; Pn `w H
if
P1  P2      Pn e H :
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As in the case of strong entailment, weak entailment involves the following two
steps:
1. Form the knowledge base KB : KB  P1  P2      Pn:
2. Infer H if KB e H :
In this type of entailment, again we see the importance of the degree of
possibility of the knowledge, Max[KB], and equivalently, its negation, the
degree of conflict ConfKB  1ÿMaxKB:
Observation. If KB is normal, MaxKB  1, then for any H, if KB ` H then
KB `w H .
Thus for normal, non-conflicting knowledge bases, weak entailment leads to
the same inference as the usual entailment. We see these as follows, assume
H  V is B is such that KB  H then it satisfies KB ` H . Furthermore, the
additional requirements for KB `w H is that MinyByP 1ÿMaxKB. If
MaxKB  1, then this additional requirement becomes MinyByP 0, a
condition always satisfied by any B.
Let us now look at the situation in which we have complete conflict,
MaxKB  0. In this case for a proposition V is B to be inferable from KB
requires
MinyByP 1ÿMaxKBP 1ÿ 0 P 1:
The only proposition that satisfies this is B  Y , the whole space. Thus here
when faced with complete conflict we revert to saying that all we are sure of is
that the value of a variable lies in its universe of discourse. Again, under this
weak inference, we do not get any of the anti-intuitive inferences that are
produced when conflict occurs using the ordinary inference.
Under the ordinary inference, we increase the number of inferences as con-
flicts occur, using strong and weak entailment we reduce the number of infer-
ences under conflict. A dierence between the strong and weak inferences is the
method they use for reducing the number of inferences under conflict. The
strong method caps the proposition by putting an upper bound on the mem-
bership grades of inferred propositions specifically the upper bound is Max[KB],
this becomes zero in the case of complete conflict. The weak method puts a lower
bound on the membership grade of the inferable propositions, specifically the
lower bound is 1ÿMaxKB, in the face of complete conflict this becomes one.
As in the case of strong entailment, weak entailment is also a non-mono-
tonic process. The same example as used in the preceding will illustrate this.
Example. Assume V has domain X  f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6g and let
P1 : V is f1; 2; 3g;
P2 : V is f3; 4g:
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From this we get as our knowledge base V is f3g. If we add
P3 V is f5; 6g;
then KB is ; and MaxKB  0. The only inferable proposition is V is X :
Again, here the basis of the non-monotonicity is due to the fact that
MaxP1  P2      PnP MaxP1  P2      Pn  Pn1;
and hence the lower bound, 1ÿMaxKB, increases as we add propositions.
As in the case of strong entailment, the non-monotonicity greatly increases
the diculty which occurring in the reasoning process. However, as in the case
of strong entailment, the type of non-monotonicity appearing here is quasi-
monotonicity.
In the following we shall provide a step toward reducing the diculty
involved in reasoning using this weak entailment. First we shall define the
operation of certainty qualification [2].
Definition. Assume P  V is A is a proposition in AR and let a 2 0; 1. We
define the proposition P is a certain denoted CertP ; a, as the proposition
P 0  V is B, where
Bx  Ax _ 1ÿ a:
Theorem. Assume P  fP1; P2; . . . ; Png is a collection of propositions, let
KB  P1      Pn and let fQ1;Q2; . . . ;Qmg be a subset of P. If
Q1;Q2; . . . ;Qm ` H then P1; P2; . . . Pn `w H 0 where H 0  CertH ;MaxKB:
Proof. Q1;Q2; . . . ;Qm ` H implies that Q1      Qm  H and hence
P1      Pn  H and thus KB  H 0. With H 0 denoted as V is B, since
H 0  CertH ;MaxKB then for any y ByP 1ÿMaxKB and we have
MinH 0P 1ÿMaxKB and the rest follows.
This theorem allows us to take advantage of the quasi-monotonicity of this
reasoning system. As a result of this theorem, we can use the usual monotonic
AR reasoning mechanism to obtain propositions and then modify them by the
degree of normality of the overall knowledge base. Again, a valid reasoning
procedure under weak entailment is the following:
1. Find Max[KB].
2. Using the ordinary reasoning mechanism, obtain H, where KB ` H .
3. Then KB `W H 0, where H 0  CertH ;MaxKB.
Eectively we are saying that we can only be Max[KB] certain about the in-
formation inferred. As in the case of strong entailment, the determination of
Max[KB] requires the use of the whole knowledge base. Here again we may use
some estimate of Max[KB] or b  1ÿMaxKB, the degree of conflict.
R.R. Yager / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 25 (2000) 15–42 31
The role of the minimal solution is the same in this reasoning system as in
the others. Assume we have a knowledge base KB in which A  ProjV1 KB,
that is, V1 is A in the minimal solution under the usual inference. Let A^ be such
that A^x  Ax _ 1ÿ a, where a MaxKB. From our previous result, we
can say that KB `w V1 is A^ . Consider now any proposition involving V1 in-
ferable from KB under weak entailment, KB `W V1 is B. Then V is B is weakly
inferable from V is A^.
6. Grading the knowledge
In the preceding, we introduced two methods for addressing the issues that
arise when conflict exists in the knowledge base, strong and weak entailment.
The approach used, in both weak and strong entailment, was to provide a
modification of the mechanism used for inference in AR by supplementing the
conditions required for entailment. These modifications retained the reasoning
mechanism used when no conflict exists while changing the process used when
conflict exists.
The modifications introduced can be seen as being too severe, in the face of
complete conflict they each reduce the allowable inferences to one. In the
following, we shall consider other possible approaches useful in the face of
conflict. In introducing these approaches we shall try to retain some inferences
in the face of conflict as well try to reduce the diculties of non-monotonicity.
One approach to avoiding the problems that arise with conflicts is to try to
reduce the intensity of conflicts. One way of mellowing the eect of conflicts in
the knowledge base is to adjudicate between dierent pieces of conflicting
knowledge. One method of adjudication can be that of assigning dierent
degrees of importance or certainty to the propositions in the knowledge base.
Let us first recall the basic procedure for reasoning in approximate rea-
soning. This procedure can be seen as involving three steps:
1. Represent knowledge in terms of AR propositions.
2. Conjunct all the individual pieces of knowledge to obtain
KB  P1  P2      Pn:
3. Infer any proposition H entailed by KB, KB  H.
The basic entailment  can, of course, be replaced by weak or strong
entailment; however, unless specifically indicated, we shall assume the basic
entailment.
In the first method to be suggested here, we introduce a degree of impor-
tance or certainty associated with each proposition in the knowledge base. As
we shall see, one eect of the introduction of this measure of importance is to
relax the constraints imposed by a proposition, this relaxation can eectively
reduce the possibility of conflict.
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Let Pi be a proposition representable in the framework of AR as V is Ai. Let
ai be a number in the unit interval indicating the weight of importance asso-
ciated with this proposition, the larger ai, the more important. While we are
generically using the term importance, the distinction in weights between
propositions is most often based upon some idea of how certain we are of the
truth of the proposition. Because of this observation, we shall use the term
certainty rather than importance. Using this terminology we shall indicate a
proposition Pi believed with certainty ai as Pi: Cert ai. Using the translation
rules of AR [2], we recall the statement V is A: Cert ai can be translated to the
proposition P^i : V is Bi, where
Bix  Aix _ 1ÿ ai:
Here we see that Bix ÿ AixP 0 and the lower the certainty value ai, the
greater this dierence.
We see that the smaller the value ai, the larger Bi and the more the restriction
imposed by Pi is relaxed. At the extreme of least certainty, ai  0, we get that
Bi  X . Thus when the certainty of a proposition is zero, we get no restriction
imposed by it. At the other extreme, the one of most certainty, ai  1 and we
get Bi  Ai, and hence, the full constraint of the proposition is enforced.
Let us now look at the overall eect of associating these certainty weights
with propositions. Consider a knowledge base consisting of the set
fP1; P2; . . . ; Png of propositions. In this case, we get KB  P1  P2      Pn.
Consider now the certainty weighted knowledge base fP^1; P^2; . . . ; P^ng wherebPi  Pi : ai certain. In this case cKB  bP1  bP2      bPn. Since for each
i, Pi  bPi, then KB  bPi and MaxcKBP MaxKB. Thus, we have increased
the possibility of getting a solution, decreased the conflict,
1ÿMaxcKB6 1ÿMaxKB, by increasing the acceptable solutions for each
proposition. Thus a decrease in the certainty associated with the propositions
has resulted in a decrease in degree of conflict. We have decreased the possi-
bility of conflict by essentially increasing the acceptable solutions for each
proposition, making Bi bigger. We see that the power of a proposition to force
out a possible solution is based upon its measure of weight, the larger its
weight, the more power. It should be pointed out that while the introduction of
certainty weights reduces degree of conflict it also reduces the inferences that
can be made since KB  cKB and inference requires inclusion of the knowledge
base in the inferred propositions. So we see that some things inferable when no
certainty weights are applied may not inferable when we apply weight, that is
we can have KB  H while cKB 6H .
Thus we see that conflict can be reduced by reducing the certainty associated
with the propositions included in the knowledge base. One nice property of this
approach is its monotonicity, the introduction of additional propositions
does not reduce the number of inferable propositions. This follows sincebP1  bP2      bPn  bP1  bP2      bPn  bPn1: We note that Dubois and
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Prade [13] have advocated a similar approach in their theory of possibilistic
logic.
7. Prioritizing the knowledge
In the preceding, we have suggested assigning a predetermined fixed certainty
value to each of the propositions. At a formal level this essentially resulted in a
weakening of the constraints imposed by the propositions, the smaller the weight,
the more the weakening. At a formal level, the weak entailment process can be
seen to be one that is also based upon a weakening of the constraints associated
with the knowledge. However, the weakening process diers in two important
ways from that used in assigning weights. First, in the weak entailment proce-
dure, rather than assigning individual degrees of certainty to each proposition,
the same certainty weight is applied to weaken all the constraints associated with
all the propositions. That is, no distinction is made between propositions. A
second dierence is that in the approach of applying certainty weights, the
weights are predetermined, introduced a priori. In the weak entailment proce-
dure, on the other hand, the amount of weakening is not predetermined, but is a
function of the degree of conflict among the propositions. In this case, the re-
duction is adaptive, if there is no conflict we get no reduction, while if we have
complete conflict we get complete reduction of the constraints. This adaptiveness
accounts for the non-monotonicity of the weak entailment method.
In the following we shall suggest an approach that can be seen to capture
some of the properties of both the weak entailment and the certainty qualifi-
cation approaches. In this method, as in the case of the weak entailment, the
relaxation of constraints is only imposed in the face of conflict, a certainty
weight of less then one is only assigned to a proposition in the face of conflict.
On the other hand, in this method, as in the case of certainty qualification
method, rather than treating all the propositions the same, a distinction is
made between the dierent propositions. Furthermore, this method does not
require an exact numeric evaluation, but is based on an ordering.
The method described in the following essentially eects the process of
conjuncting the various pieces of knowledge. It is very much in the spirit of the
types of non-monotonic logics introduced in the AI literature [14] and closely
related to the one introduced by Yager [15].
Assume we have a knowledge base consisting of n propositions, Pj for j  1
to n. In addition, we shall assume a priority ordering over these propositions
P1 > P2 >    > Pn;
where Pi > Pj indicates that we have more confidence or certainty in proposi-
tion Pi than Pj. Intuitively, the idea carried by Pi > Pj is that if there is some
conflict, resolve it in favor of Pi.
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The essential idea here is that we shall associate with each proposition a
certainty value, however, this certainty value shall be a function of the com-
patibility of the proposition with the knowledge contained in the propositions
of higher priority. In order to accomplish this we shall modify the process used
for conjoining the individual propositions in forming the overall knowledge
base. Rather than taking all the propositions at once, we shall introduce them
in order of their priority, the higher priority ones first. In addition, to intro-
ducing a proposition, we shall associate with each proposition introduced a
weight, certainty value, related to its compatibility with the already introduced
knowledge.
Let P1; P2; . . . ; Pn be our premises and assume the existence of a priority
ordering, Pi > Pj if i < j. We shall let KB(j) denote the combined knowledge
base after have introduced the first j propositions of highest priority. We note
that KB(n) is our complete knowledge base after all propositions are intro-
duced, we have previously indicated as KB.
The following is the inductive procedure for forming the knowledge base
resulting from our prioritized collection of propositions.
KB1  P1; I
KBj  KBjÿ 1  bPj for j  2 to n: II
In the above, bPj is a certainty qualified version of Pj; bPj  Pj : aj certain, it is Pj
with certainty aj. As indicated, the weight aj associated with Pj is a function of
the compatibility of Pj and KBjÿ 1. We shall see the more compatible, the
less conflicting, Pj is with the already established knowledge KBjÿ 1 the
larger it’s weight or certainty, aj.
Let us look at the situation in more detail. Assume KBjÿ 1 
V is Ajÿ1; Pj  V is Bj and let us denote KBj  V is Aj. The termbPj  V is Bj : aj certain, translates into V is bBj, wherebBjx  Bjx _ 1ÿ aj:
Calculating KBj  KBjÿ 1  bPj we get
Ajx  Ajÿ1x ^ Bjx _ 1ÿ aj;
Ajx  Ajÿ1x ^ Bjx _ Ajÿ1x ^ 1ÿ aj:
We see that we introduce a reflaxation of the constraint associated with Pj
depending upon aj. We note 1ÿ aj can be seen as some measure of the
perceived conflict between Pj and Ajÿ1. As we shall see aj will depend upon
PossV is Bj=V is Ajÿ1, the compatibility of Pj and KBjÿ 1.
Using this aggregation procedure we get an iterative construction of
the overall knowledge base. In this construction each proposition introduced
has the possibility of having its constraints relaxed depending upon its
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compatibility with the knowledge provided by higher priority information; the
more compatibility, the less the relaxation.
Let us now consider the issue of the determination of the certainty weight aj,
used to modify the proposition Pj. In the following we shall measure the literal
conflict between Pj and KBjÿ 1 as the complement of the compatibility
between these two objects
Conf Pj j KBjÿ 1  1ÿ PossPj j KBjÿ 1
 1ÿ PossV is Bj=V is Aj ÿ 1:
For simplicity of notation we shall denote this as uj, Conf Pj j KBjÿ 1  uj.
We note the degree of conflict uj takes its value in the unit interval, I.
To provide the most generality in building our systems we shall allow the
system to accommodate dierent levels of conflict. In order to accomplish this
we introduce a fuzzy subset H, called acceptable level of conflict. H is a fuzzy
subset on the degree of conflict, H : I ! I , such that for u 2 I , Hu measures
the degree to which the system is willing to accept u conflict between the existing
knowledge and the new introduced data. Some examples of this fuzzy set are
shown in Fig. 1.
Let us indicate some general properties that should be associated with the
function H:
1. The more conflict the less acceptable: if u > v, then Hu6Hv.
2. Zero conflict is completely acceptable: H0  1.
Generally, we also desire H1  0, complete conflict is completely unac-
ceptable.
Fig. 1. Some examples of fuzzy subset acceptable level of conflict.
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If H1 and H2 are two functions such that H1u6H2u for all u we shall say
that H1 is more severe or stronger than H2. The more severe the less acceptable
any conflict.
Using H we shall let the certainty weight, aj, associated with the proposition
Pj be equal to the membership grade uj in H. Thus
aj  Huj  H1ÿ PossPj j KBjÿ 1:
Since Ajx  Ajÿ1x ^ Bjx _ 1ÿ aj using this we get
Ajx  Ajÿ1x ^ Bjx _ 1ÿ Huj;
Ajx  Ajÿ1x ^ Bjx _ 1ÿ H1ÿ PossPj j KBjÿ 1;
Ajx  Ajÿ1x ^ Bjx _ 1ÿ H1ÿ PossV is Bj=V is Ajÿ1:
In deciding upon a function H to use in a system, we see that we are es-
sentially making a tradeo. If we make H severe, then eectively any conflict
between Pj and KBjÿ 1 will cause Huj to be very small. This will make
1ÿ Huj big and hence Bjx _ 1ÿ Huj  1 and thus Ajx  Ajÿ1x. Here
while we have no eective conflict, we have very strongly reduced any infor-
mation provided by Bj. On the other hand, if we make H very lax, then Huj
will be large for even strongly conflicting Pj and KBjÿ 1. In this case bBj  Bj
and we get Ajx  Ajÿ1x ^ Bjx. Here while we have retained the informa-
tion contained in Pj we can have the possibility of conflict. Thus, we see the
issue involved in selecting H is between possibly allowing conflicts and re-
taining the information provided in the proposition Pj.
Let us look at this conjunction operation for special cases of H. If we let
every degree of conflict be acceptable, Hu  1 for all u then
Ajx  Ajÿ1x ^ Bjx _ 1ÿ Huj  Ajx ^ Bjx:
This is the usual conjunction with no consideration made for conflicts. If we let
H be linear, Hu  1ÿ u we get
Ajx  Ajÿ1x ^ Bjx _ 1ÿ H1ÿ PossBj j Ajÿ1;
Ajx  Ajÿ1x ^ Bjx _ 1ÿ PossBj j Ajÿ1:
This form was introduced by Yager in [15].
Consider H such that
Hu  1; u6K;
Hu  0; u < K:
Here we are providing a threshold, conflict less than K is completely
acceptable, while that greater then K completely unacceptable. In order for
degree of conflict to be less or equal K, we must have PossV is Bj=V is Ajÿ1
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> 1ÿ K. If this is so then H1ÿ PossV is Bj=V is Ajÿ1  1 and Dx 
Ax ^ Bx. On the other hand, if PossV is Bj=V is Ajÿ16 1ÿ K then
H1ÿ PossV is Bj=V is Ajÿ1  0 and Dx  Ax. Thus here we have a
switch type conjunction. In this case, K can be seen as our acceptable degree of
conflict.
In order to study the new aggregation procedure in more detail let us in-
troduce some notation that will help simplify the following discussion. Let
P1  V is A and P2  V is B be two propositions. We shall denote our new
aggregation procedure as P1 ?H P2, that is
P1 ?H P2  Ax ^ Bx _ 1ÿ H1ÿ PossP2=P1:
In the important special case in which Hu  1ÿ u, the linear case, we shall
use P1 ?H P2, that is
P1 ?H P2  Ax ^ Bx _ 1ÿ PossP2=P1:
Once having obtained the overall knowledge base, KB, by the aggregation
procedure described we than can use the usual entailment principle to deter-
mine valid inferences, let us look at this process. Assume we have a knowledge
base fP1; . . . ; Png, where Pi > Pj if i < j. We shall indicate the overall knowledge
base KB using the preceding notation as
KB  P1 ?H P2 ?H P3    ?H Pn
here we note
KBj  P1 ?H P2 ?H P3    ?H Pj;
KBj  KBjÿ 1 ?H Pj:
Once having determined KB then we can infer any proposition H such
that KB  H . What should be clear is that if no conflict exists,
MaxP1  P2      Pn  1, then the above procedure reduces to the ordinary
inference. In particular, in this case
P1  P2      Pn  P1 ?H P2 ?H P3    ?H Pn:
This follows since at any point PossPi=Pj  1 and hence u  0. Thus this
structure preserves the usual reasoning in the case when no subnormality,
conflict, exists.
One undesirable feature of this approach is that it is nonmonotonic, if we
introduce new information, it is possible to lose some already established in-
ferences. The following example illustrates this.
38 R.R. Yager / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 25 (2000) 15–42
Example. Let V have domain X  f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6g. Assume we have two
propositions:
P1 : V is f1; 2; 3g;
P2 : V is f4; 5g;
where P1 > P2 and Hu  1ÿ u:
Since PossP2 j P1  1 calculating KB  P1 ? P2 we get KB : V is f1g, thus
we infer V is 1. Assume now we introduce an additional proposition
P3 : V is f5; 6g;
where P3 > P1 > P2. Here we get
KB1  P3;
KB2  KB1 ? P1  P3 ? P2:
Here KB2x  P3x ^ P1x _ 1ÿ H1ÿ PossP1=P3, since PossP3 j
P1  0, then KB2  P3. Finally KB  P3 ? P2, since PossP2 j P3  1
then KB  P3 \ P2  V is f5g. Thus here we can infer that V  5 rather then
V  1.
Actually the situation regarding monotonicity is not all that bad. First we note
that if P3  P1 ?H P2 then P3  P1. We see this as follows let P1  V is A, P2  V
is B and P1  V is D then Dx  Ax ^ Bx _ 1ÿ H1ÿ PossB=A6
Ax, thus P1 is inferable from the knowledge P1 and P2 when P1 > P2. It should
be noted that P2 is not necessarily inferable in this case, that is it is possible for
Dx > Bx:
Assume P1 > P2 >    > Pn constitutes our knowledge, in this case,
KBj  KBjÿ 1 ?H Pj  P1 ?H P2 ?H P3    ?H Pj:
Assume G is some proposition where KBjÿ 1  G, that is,
P1; . . . ; Pjÿ1 `H G, G is inferable from the collection of this prioritized col-
lection of propositions. Since
KBj  KBjÿ 1 ?H Pj;
then according to observation made above, KBj  KBjÿ 1 and in turn,
KBj  G. This implies that G is also inferable from fP1; . . . ; Pjg. Thus we see
the following theorem holds.
Theorem. If P1 > P2 >    > Pn and P1; . . . ; Pj ÿ 1 `H G then P1; . . . ; Pj `H G:
The implication of this is that the addition of knowledge with priority less then
any proposition used to make some inference cannot cause us to to have to
withdraw that inference.
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This situation has some useful applications. If we are interested in inferring
G from P1 >    > Pn, we can start constructing our knowledge from P1
downward if at any point we obtain a KB(j) such that KBj  G then we
know KB  G and G is inferable from the complete knowledge base.
This situation implies a type of monotonicity. Let fP1; . . . ; Png be our
knowledge base with priority P1 >    > Pn. Assume G is inferable from this
knowledge base. Let P be an additional proposition . Then if P is such that
Pn > P , P has lower priority than everything in our knowledge base, we can still
infer P from our new augmented knowledge base, fP1; . . . Pn; Pg. As a matter
of fact an even stronger result can be obtained. Let KBj 
P1 ?H P2 ?H P3    ?H Pj If there exists some j, where KBj  G then if P has
lower priority than Pj, that is Pj > P , then G is still inferable from our new
augmented knowledge base.
Thus we see that if a newly added proposition has lower priority than any of
the already existing propositions everything that was inferable is still inferable,
we have monotonicity. Non-monotonicity comes into play only when a newly
introduced proposition has higher priority than some of the already existing
propositions. Unfortunately, this often is the case in the real world, as new
information is usually considered more reliable than old information.
Let us investigate this situation. Again let fP1; . . . ; Png be our knowledge
base with priority P1 >    > Pn. Assume KBj 1  P1 ?H P2 ?H P3    ?H
Pj1 and let KBj 1  G and KBj 6G, G is inferable from the knowledge
base at level j 1. Let P be a new proposition such that Pj > P > Pj1, in
priority P lies between Pj and Pj1. Denoting cKB  cKBj ?H P anddcKB  cKB ?H Pj1 we have no guarantee that dcKB 6G in this case.
In the preceding, we have assumed a strict linear ordering between the
propositions, Pi > Pj if i6 j. An alternative and perhaps more realistic envi-
ronment is one in which we have a partial ordering. Assume P  fP1; . . . ; Png
are a collection of propositions such that the they can be grouped into a
partition of m disjoint subsets of P;C1; . . . ;Cm, called classes, such that all
propositions in the same class are said to have the same priority and those in Ci
are said to have higher priority than those of Cj if i < j. Essentially, we have
ordered equivalence classes.
In this situation we suggest one approach to the formation of the over-
all knowledge base as follows. For each equivalence class Cj, we form the
conjoin of all the propositions in that class. Thus if Cj  fPj1; Pj2; . . . ; Pjnjg we
form
C ÿ Cj  Pj1  Pj2      Pjnj :
We then use of these propositions in the way in which we used the regular
propositions when we had a strict order, that is, our overall knowledge base is
KB  C ÿ C1 ?H C ÿ C2 ?H?H C ÿ Cm;
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that is
KB1  C ÿ C1;
KBj  KBjÿ 1 ?H C ÿ Cj . . . j  2 to m:
If PossC ÿ Cj=KBjÿ 1 < 1 we may want to use some other definition
for C ÿ Cj. Let Sj be a subset of the propositions in Cj and let C ÿ Sj be
the conjunction of the propositions in Sj. Let us define
KBSj  KBjÿ 1 ?H C ÿ Sj. We then use as KBj;KBSj , where
Inf KBSj  MaxSjCj Inf KBSj:
Here instead of Cj we use the subset Sj of Cj which maximizes the information
in KBj  KBjÿ 1 ?H C ÿ Sj. We recall one measure of information as-
sociated with a proposition V is A discussed in [12] is the specificity of A
Inf V is A  Ax ÿAveAÿ x;
here Ax is the maximal membership grade in A and AveAÿ x is the av-
erage of all the membership grades in A excluding x. It can be shown that if Cj
just has one element, Sj  Cj, this gives us the usual approach. If
PossC ÿ Cj=KBjÿ 1  1 then it can also be shown that Sj  Cj:
8. Conclusion
Our focus in this work has been to provide mechanisms to enable the fuzzy
set based approximate reasoning system to deal with conflicts in knowledge.
We first suggested two alternative mechanisms for implementing inference in
AR. These mechanisms, called strong and weak entailment, modified the en-
tailment principle, the basic inference tool in AR. Both of these approaches
resulted in a situation in which only one inference was allowable in the face of
complete conflict. In addition both these mechanisms forced us to give up
monotonicity.
Our second direction was to try to avoid conflict or lessen its eect by re-
laxing the constraints imposed by our knowledge. Here we first suggested a
weighting associated with each piece of knowledge and used this weight to
appropriately relax the constraints imposed by the pieces of knowledge. The
second approach was to prioritize our knowledge. This allows lower priority
knowledge to defer to higher priority knowledge to avoid conflict.
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